We show how the so-called distributional characteristic of a policy instrument can be additively decomposed into two components; one that captures the targeting efficiency of the instrument, the other its redistributive efficiency. Using these measures, we provide an interpretation of the commonly used leakage and undercoverage rates (and other indices based on these concepts) within standard welfare theory. Essentially, one can interpret such indices as special (and restrictive) cases of the targeting efficiency index. As well as failing to capture the relative redistributive efficiencies of policy instruments, they also implicitly assume a
INTRODUCTION
In response to a tightening of government finances in the wake of structural adjustment reforms and other budgetary "shocks" in developing countries, the desire to design more efficient poverty-alleviation (or transfer) programs has become central to the policy debate. In terms of policy choices, there has been a movement toward policy instruments that "target" the budget more efficiently to the "target group," e.g., the poor. A common approach to evaluating 1 the relative efficiency of alternative programs has been to compare leakage and undercoverage rates (Baker and Grosh 1994) , or the closely related concepts of E-mistakes and F-mistakes (Cornia and Stewart 1995) , as well as ROC curves (Wodon 1997 ). While such indicators capture some aspects of the welfare impacts from better targeting, they also have obvious shortcomings. For example, the undercoverage (U) and leakages (L) approach focus on the identity of the recipients, i.e., poor or nonpoor, ignoring the size and distribution of the budget. This paper has four objectives. After this introduction, Section 2 sets out a simple general equilibrium model for the evaluation of alternative transfer programs (or policy instruments).
Using this model, we derive the total welfare impact for a range of policy instruments as the sum of the direct effect on welfare plus the indirect welfare effect arising from the need to restore equilibrium in product and factor markets as well as to public finances. Most analyses of the distributional impact of programs focus on the direct impact on welfare, and in this paper we are concerned exclusively with this component. Section 3 derives the so-called distributional characteristic of a policy instrument as the welfare-weighted sum of transfers across households divided by the unweighted sum of transfers, i.e., the transfer budget. We show how one can additively decompose this statistic into two terms, one that captures the targeting efficiency of the instrument, the other its redistributive efficiency. Section 4 uses this decomposition to provide an interpretation of the conventional leakage and undercoverage rates. Essentially, these can be seen as special (and restrictive) cases of the targeting efficiency index. Finally, for purely illustrative purposes, Section 5 presents an empirical application of the decomposition using Mexican data, showing that the welfare gains associated with moving away from universal subsidies arise mainly from improved targeting-as opposed to redistributive-efficiency. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In this section we set out a simple general equilibrium model that helps to highlight the important ingredients in any welfare evaluation of alternative policy instruments. The model presented draws heavily on the work of Drèze and Stern (1987) , which in turn owes much to Guesnerie (1979) . See Coady and Harris (2000) for a more formal discussion and for calculations for Mexico. 2 We are obviously treating the household as the relevant unit for welfare analysis. This formulation 3 ignores a number of important policy issues related to the intrahousehold allocation of resources, e.g., the response of households to the transfer of resources to individual members (children, females).
The impact of any policy instrument (e.g., the introduction, or change in the level, of a tax or cash transfer) on social welfare can be separated into its direct impact on welfare and its indirect impact arising from the need to restore equilibrium in product and factor markets as well as in government finances. The policy instrument leads to changes in demand that, in general, must be met by reallocating scarce resources between competing activities. If all markets are perfectly competitive and the government has access to optimal lump-sum transfers, then aggregate indirect effects are zero because on the margin the benefits from reallocation equal the costs (i.e., marginal benefits are set equal to marginal costs throughout the economy and these also coincide with social costs and benefits). Where income distribution is sub-optimal, any indirect welfare effects arise solely from the redistribution of income. In the absence of perfect markets or where there are government-induced tax distortions, additional indirect welfare effects, due to the "reallocation" of resources and the "deadweight loss" from taxes, are also present. In general, such indirect effects can constitute a substantial proportion of the direct effects, even for marginal reforms.
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Consider an economy with three sets of agents: households, firms, and the government.
Households are assumed to maximize utility that is a function of consumption levels, subject to a budget constraint that ensures that incomes equal expenditures. In addition, households may 3 Throughout, bold type indicates a vector. 4 face quantity constraints, e.g., subsidized rationing of some commodities. Household behavior can then be completely captured by an indirect utility function, V(q,q ,m,0 0), where q is a vector s of prices faced by the consumer (including the price of labor), q is a vector of subsidized ration s prices, m is household lump-sum income, and0 0 is a vector of commodity rations. The budget 4 constraint for each household (denoted by h superscript) is then given by q.x = m where m is lump-sum (nonlabor) incomes defined for each household as
where r is a cash transfer by the government to household h and 0 0 is a vector of commodity h h ration levels facing the household that it receives at a subsidized price, q < q. Firms are s assumed to operate under constant returns to scale so that supply is demand determined and profits are zero. The government's budget constraint is given by
where t is a vector of taxes on commodities consumed and factors supplied by households, with t = q -p and p being a vector of producer prices. Since producer prices are assumed fixed, we have dq = dt.
The problem the "social planner" then faces is to redistribute resources using the most efficient policy instruments from among a set that includes commodity taxes or subsidies, ration levels and prices, and cash transfers. The constraints facing the planner are the market equilibrium constraints that demand must equal supply as well as the government budget
This implicitly assumes that the only distortions in the economy are government induced. Where 5 other market imperfections exist one needs to focus on "shadow revenue" which captures income effects accruing outside the government budget. See Drèze and Stern (1987) for detailed discussion.
(1) The policy reforms under consideration are assumed to include a change in the tax (subsidy) on commodity i, a change in the quantity or price of a rationed commodity, or an introduction of a cash-transfer program. All can be viewed as part of the exogenous policy parameters, T T. The welfare impact of each policy reform can be seen by differentiating (1) w.r.t. each of the policy instruments (i.e., m , t , q , and 0 0 ) to get
This derivation makes use of the fact that the welfare impacts of changes in s in response to changes 6 in T T can, by the envelope theorem, be ignored.
(2)
where the first term on the right-hand side captures the direct welfare effects and the second term, the indirect welfare effects. Below we consider each policy reform in turn. 6 We first consider a (marginal) change in government transfers to households, weight"). This welfare weight is higher for the more "deserving," e.g., the poor, and so the social value depends on the distribution of the transfers across households. 8 is the social cost of the revenue used to finance the transfer (i.e., the so-called cost of public funds), and the last term in brackets on the right-hand side captures the indirect revenue effects as demands change in response to the transfer. If households receiving the transfers have a high propensity to buy relatively highly taxed commodities, then this will reduce the net impact on the government budget and thus decrease the social cost of the transfer.
Now consider a change in the tax of commodity i, e.g., food. If all households are net consumers of i, then redistributing income will usually involve reducing t (or increasing the
subsidy, in which case t is negative). Using the standard properties of the indirect utility i function, the welfare impact of a tax change is then
The first term indicates that households gain from the reform according to the level of their existing consumption; the existing level of demand gives a measure of this welfare effect in money terms. The direct impact on social welfare is greater the more poor households consume the good. Again, the social cost of the transfer using a commodity tax is lower if households respond to the price change by switching demand away from (toward) relatively highly subsidized (taxed) commodities.
The impact of a change in the subsidy on rationed commodities is got by differentiating
(1) w.r.t. q to get is The extent to which households lose depends on the level of the ration quantities they receive.
Also, the government receives budget gains as the subsidy bill decreases, these gains being offset if households decrease their consumption of relatively heavily taxed commodities.
Changing the level of a ration involves differentiating w.r.t. 0 0 giving
On this, and related issues, see Dixit (1975) , Drèze and Stern (1987) and Coady and Drèze (2000) .
(6)
where h indicates the number of households who receive the extra rations. Households gain by * the extent of the subsidy (i.e., they switch from more expensive market purchases when they get the extra ration) with the social value of the change increasing the more effectively the rations are targeted at poor households. This essentially assumes that rations are infra-marginal or that resale is possible. But the government has to finance the extra subsidized consumption (although it receives extra revenue to offset this if households increase their consumption of taxed commodities). Where the commodity cannot be purchased through a market, q must be i replaced with the marginal willingness to pay, which can obviously vary across households.
The above equations can be interpreted as the marginal social value (MSV) of a change in each policy instrument, being positive/negative when the reform increases/decreases welfare.
Alternatively, these can be interpreted as optimality conditions where we set the MSV to zero and solve for the optimal level of the relevant policy instrument. This simply highlights the fact that it is sometimes useful to interpret optimal policy as a special case of the theory of policy reform-the optimum is a situation from which no welfare-improving reform exists. In the next 7 See Coady and Harris (2000) for a more detailed discussion and an empirical example.
8 section, we use the above set of equations to provide a very useful framework for distributional policy analysis.
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS
The preceding section set out the ingredients for the evaluation of policy reform in the context of a simple general equilibrium model. This section focuses more specifically on the distributional impact of these reforms and ignores completely the general equilibrium consequences. This is not to say that these impacts are unimportant; on the contrary, they can be quite significant when the economy is characterized by large "distortions" and may differ substantially across instruments. Rather, the focus reflects that of much of the literature on the distributive efficiency of alternative policy instruments, which is our main concern here. The indirect effects identified above may be added onto the direct effects identified below to get the total effect. 8 The direct distributional effect of the policy reforms (which by definition ignores the indirect general equilibrium welfare effects) can be derived from the above equations either by setting t = 0 (i.e., by essentially assuming they are zero since no "distortions" exist) or by assuming no behavioral responses (i.e., price and income elasticities are zero). We can then solve out for the relevant 8, which can be interpreted as the marginal social benefit of
In this simple model, i.e., ignoring the general equilibrium (or, equivalently, second-best) effects, at 9 the optimum 8s will also be equal to the same social marginal utility of income to households ($), which will be constant across households, consistent with income distribution being optimal. In a second-best world, the optimum will not in general be characterized by equal incomes or a constant $ (see Coady and Drèze 2000 for more detailed discussion).
(7)
transferring an extra unit of government revenue to households using each policy instrument Stern 1984, 1991; Skoufias and Coady 2000) . For example, for a cash-transfer program this is calculated as where the denominator can be interpreted as the poverty-alleviation transfer budget. This is essentially a benefit-cost ratio with the welfare-weighted sum of transfers across households constituting the benefit and the unweighted sum of transfers (i.e., the transfer budget) as the cost. A similar parameter can be derived for each policy instrument by replacing dm with x for i tax instruments, by 0 0 for changes in the price of rationed commodities, and by (q -q ) for i i is changes in the prices of rationed commodities (summed over h ). At the optimum, the 8s across * instruments will be equalized. Away from the optimum, for each instrument there will be a 8 '
By letting $ reflect the weights implicit in poverty evaluations (e.g., weights being zero above the 10 h poverty line but positive and nondecreasing in income below), we get standard results in the poverty literature (Besley and Kanbur 1988) . Where the transfer takes the form of changing universal ration subsidies (or equivalently universal income transfers), using the poverty gap measure we get the result that the marginal social benefit (8) is a function of the headcount index (Besley and Kanbur 1988, 704-706) . The greater the proportion of the transfer budget received by poor households (or, equivalently, the greater the proportion of the total ration quantities consumed by the poor) the higher is 8. The result is easily extended to the case where the rations are geographically targeted. When we consider subsidies on market-purchased goods, the result is "that the net effect depends on how large total consumption of a commodity is relative to its consumption by the poor" (p. 708), which is another way of stating the budget allocation criterion as captured in 8.
(8)
separate 8, and these can then be compared across instruments. Social welfare can be increased by switching from instruments with low 8s to those with high 8s. by subtracting a proportional transfer from beneficiaries, as opposed to a uniform transfer, with the factor of proportionality being determined both by the total incomes of beneficiary households and the total budget. As before, 8 is still independent of the size of the budget.
T
One way of interpreting these alternative decompositions is in terms of their informational requirements. Given the budget and knowledge of which households receive transfers, the uniform transfer requires only extra information on the number receiving transfers, while the proportional requires additional information on incomes or at least the sum of incomes. Note also that a uniform transfer financed by a proportional tax is progressive (8 > 0), but a R proportional transfer financed by a uniform poll tax is regressive (8 < 0). Therefore, defining
neutrality with reference to deviations from a uniform transfer implicitly reflects a stronger concern for redistribution.
Below we will use this decomposition to interpret the more conventional leakage and undercoverage measures of targeting efficiency within the above welfare theoretic framework.
We will also use this decomposition for an empirical analysis of the relative welfare impact of alternative transfer instruments. For the sake of argument, consider some reference transfer scheme, j, e.g., the status quo or some optimal scheme. Then the welfare impact of moving to 
p,i i p,i p
An obvious criticism of these indicators is that they focus only on who gets the transfers and not on how much households get (i.e., the size of the transfer budget). Also, when comparing across programs, it is often the case that those that score well on undercoverage simultaneously score badly on leakage. For example, so-called universal programs would be expected to score relatively well on undercoverage but badly on leakage, but this approach does not address the issue of trade-off. Much of the problem lies in the fact that welfare weights are not made explicit, although it is obvious that all the poor and all the nonpoor are treated similarly-even if the issue of their relative weights is ignored.
We can try to give a possible interpretation to U and L within the standard welfare framework described above. Consider a program that has a budget of $1 for every poor household and that distributes $1 to N households using an imperfect targeting rule. If everyone i below the poverty line is given a welfare weight of unity and everyone above the poverty line a welfare weight of zero, as is the case for the poverty gap indicator, then for this program we have, using equation (7), which can also be interpreted as the proportion of the total budget (i.e., of N by construction) holds when the receipt of some income by a nonpoor household precludes the receipt of any income by a poor household, i.e., either the money goes to a poor or to a nonpoor household.
It will apply, for example, when the number of (not necessarily poor) households given transfers is determined by the number of poor households.
If all of the transfer to poor households contributed to reducing the poverty gap, then (1 -L) equals 13 the percentage reduction in the poverty gap. However, in practice, transfers to some poor households may be more than sufficient to bring the household up to the poverty line, so that (1 -L) is an upper bound on the latter. The difference essentially arises from the fact that whereas our "marginal" analysis of transfers assumes welfare weights are fixed, the leakage measures encompass a discrete welfare weighting scheme whereby the weight attached to a poor household goes from 1 to zero on crossing the poverty line. See also the discussion in Atkinson (1995, 30) of the concept of "horizontal efficiency" used by Weisbrod (1970) . To get from 8 to the poverty gap measure, just insert, in equation (8), dm = (z -y ) for those brought over the poverty line, z.
h h
Note that there appears to be a discrepancy in Table 1 of Wodon (1997 Wodon ( , 2084 and its note regarding 14 definitions. We use SP and SE definitions, which both reflect successes.
To summarize, (1-L) is a valid measure of the welfare impact only for programs that transfer equal amounts to beneficiaries and only for a particular set of welfare weights (those consistent with the poverty gap indicator). Using equation (8) 
ROC CURVES
The welfare basis of the related concept of "relative operating characteristics" (ROC)
curves can also be addressed using the above formula (Wodon 1997 ). This approach to poverty analysis uses the concepts of "sensitivity" (SE) and "specificity" (SP) defined as follows:
Sensitivity: The proportion of poor households who receive benefits (are "in").
Specificity:
The proportion of nonpoor households not in the program.
Using the earlier notation, these are thus calculated as
18 and Again, since, in general, N can differ across programs, both SE and SP need to be adjusted i before they can be used for welfare comparisons across programs that transfer equal amounts to beneficiaries. With regard to ROC analysis where, for a given poverty line, one chooses the program (or instrument) that minimizes some weighted average of SE and SP (with, say, a and b as weights, respectively), it should be clear that these weights should be such that the program chosen should also maximize 8. It is straightforward to show that for this to hold it must be that a = " + b(n/p), where a and b are the weights on SE and SP, respectively, " is the number of poor households divided by the total number of households receiving transfers, n is the proportion of nonpoor who receive, and p the proportion of poor who receive.
E-AND F-MISTAKES
Others in the literature refer to E-and F-mistakes (Cornia and Stewart 1995). Fmistakes are equivalent to U above. E-mistakes are usually defined similarly to leakage using
either the total number of nonpoor or the total population as the numerator. However, here we wish to focus on the definition of E-mistakes as where v is the average transfer received by all nonpoor households and S is the total budget. It is this easy to see that, for programs transferring equal amounts to beneficiaries, this just equals where the numerator is summed over all nonpoor and the denominator is summed over all households (i.e., poor and nonpoor). As Cornia and Stewart (1995, 353) recognized, "where the subsidy consists of a given sum, equal for each recipient…, this ratio is equivalent to the ratio of N /N " (our notation). From our perspective, choosing the program with the lowest np,i i E-mistakes is equivalent to choosing that with the highest 8, so the former is also the correct welfare measure, but again only for welfare weights consistent with the poverty gap measure.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE DECOMPOSITION USING DATA FROM MEXICO
This section shows how the decomposition presented above can be used to evaluate the relative targeting and redistributive efficiencies of alternative policy instruments.
For the purposes of illustration, we focus on the recent shift in Mexico's poverty alleviation strategy toward better-targeted transfer schemes. The point of departure is one where universal food (i.e., cereals) subsidies constitute the main plank of the poverty alleviation strategy.
However, these are perceived as being poorly targeted with much leakage of benefits to nonpoor households.
One can then consider a number of alternative targeting strategies. Here we consider two broad approaches: demographic and poverty targeting. Demographic targeting involves giving transfers only to households with children, similar to child benefit in many developed countries.
Poverty targeting involves giving transfers only to households classified as poor according to some-usually welfare-based-criterion. The actual program implemented in Mexico is a combination of these two approaches, with an element of geographic targeting also involved.
The targeted programs considered here are:
(i) Demographic transfers: where cash transfers are given to all households with children according to the structure set out in Table 1 . Four alternatives are considered, namely, transfers to those children ages 0-4 years, transfers to those ages 5-10 years, See Case and Deaton (1998) for an example of a cash transfer (pension) scheme targeted at older age 15 groups in South Africa, which they find to be a good targeting mechanism given the high dependency ratios in these households.
transfers to those ages 0-10 years, transfers to those ages 5-19 years, or transfers given to those ages 0-19 years.
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(ii) Poverty transfers: where cash transfers, set at a uniform rate, are given to poor households. Also considered are a geographically targeted version where a uniform transfer is given to all households located in poor municipalities. Such uniform transfers can also be interpreted as capturing the welfare impacts arising from changes either in the levels of infra-marginal subsidized consumer rations or changes in the subsidy levels.
The actual program implemented was a combination of both (i) and (ii), since demographic transfers were given to poor households. This combined program is used to Notes: The program with cash transfers to 0-4-year-olds is denoted by "DemoC," to 5-10-year-olds by "DemoP," to 5-19-year-olds by "DemoPS," and to 0-19-year-olds by "DemoAll." When poverty targeting is combined with demographic targeting, programs are denoted by placing a "P" in front, e.g., "PDemoP" for a demographic program targeted at 5-10-year-olds. The "PDemoPS" program is used to determine the budget, which is then held fixed across all programs, e.g., by scaling the benefits structure up or down as appropriate.
Note that this study does not address the issue of imperfect targeting information, i.e., where an 16 imperfect indicator of income might have to be chosen. For an analysis that suggests that the welfare losses from having to choose income over preferred consumption are minimal, see Skoufias and Coady (2000) . 
income of all poor households, i.e., the average incomes would have to be increased to eliminate poverty, and even then this would have to be distributed optimally (i.e., no leakage to the nonpoor and transfers being just sufficient to bring the household to the poverty line). The budget comes out at 47 percent of the poverty gap.
To calculate the various 8s, one needs to specify a set of welfare weights, $ . The h conventional approach is to calculate these as where k is a reference household (e.g., the household on the poverty line) and , > 0 is a parameter that captures our aversion to income inequality. The higher this parameter, the The magnitude of the welfare gain in moving from food subsidies to demographically targeted programs is similar to the gain in moving from these latter programs to the combination of poverty and demographic targeting.
Figures 2a and 2b present the proportional welfare gains in moving from food subsidies, and decomposes this gain into that due to improved targeting efficiency and that due to improved redistributive efficiency using equation (9). The contrast between demographic and poverty targeting is clear. As expected, most of the welfare gain from demographic targeting is due to improved redistributive efficiency, whereas most of the welfare gain from poverty targeting is due to improved targeting efficiency. Thus, there is a very high return from improving targeting efficiency, i.e., the additional redistributive gains from combining poverty with demographic targeting are relatively small. Similar results follow when we use proportional-as opposed to uniform-transfers as our reference for neutrality (Figure 3a, 3b) .
In summary, then, the important gains achieved by moving away from universal food subsidies to the combined demographic-and poverty-targeted program implemented in Mexico arise mainly from the greater targeting (as opposed to redistributive) efficiency of the approach.
The returns to efforts devoted to identifying which households are most deserving (i.e., the poor) appear to be quite substantial. Using, as an illustration, the recent policy switch in Mexico toward a more targeted povertyalleviation program, we show that the biggest welfare gain in moving away from universal subsidies is due to improved targeting, as opposed to redistributive, efficiency. 
